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Abstract 
This article applies crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to gain insight in the 
compliance motivations and compliance behaviours of 101 Chinese farmers. It seeks to understand 
how eight motivations (capacity to comply, legal knowledge,  deterrent effect of sanctions, cost-
benefit analysis, descriptive social norms,  morals, general duty to obey, and procedural justice) 
combine in compliant and non-compliant behaviour, and whether there is only one combination of 
motivations or several that lead to compliance and non-compliance . It illustrates how csQCA assists 
in making visible and analyzing situations of interacting compliance motivations (conjunctural 
causality) and situations where different combinations of motivations result in similar compliance 
behaviour (equifinality). It identifies symmetrical and non-symmetrical relationships between specific 
compliance motivations and compliance behaviours—indicating that motivations for non-compliance 
are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance. This non-symmetry may logically be 
explained because deterrence plays a different role in compliance decisions than in non-compliance 
decisions. The article concludes by highlighting the relevance of such insights for theorizing on 
compliance and for law enforcement, and the limitations of the method applied.  
 
Keywords 




A key question of regulation and governance scholarship is why individuals and organisations obey 
or violate the law (Tyler 1990). To answer it, scholars have studied conditions considered to affect 
compliance, such as the deterring effect of sanctions or a general duty to obey the law by individuals 
and organisations (further: regulatees). They point out that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
trace ‘the’ single condition that best explains compliance. More likely, conditions interact in causing 
compliant behaviour (i.e., conjunctural causation) and different (combinations of) conditions can 
simultaneously contribute to compliant behaviour (i.e., equifinality) (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; 
Gunningham et al. 2003; Lehmann Nielsen & Parker 2012).  
Understanding it is unlikely that a single motivation best explains compliance or non-
compliance, scholars often develop typologies that bring together different (sets of) compliance 
motivations in a number of types. Their typologies can be broadly clustered in two groups: ‘ideal 
types’ and ‘(narrow) patterns’. Ideal types seek to present a holistic understanding of compliance 
behaviour. Their value lies in their ‘elegance’ (cf., Van der Berg 2003): Regulatees are clustered in 
types that are loosely built on compliance motivations identified in the literature, and the types are 
so general that they can be used as descriptors in a wide range of contexts. These typologies come, 
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however, with some critiques (May 2005; Parker & Nielsen 2009): They easily become subject to a 
‘too many variables, too few observations’ problem, which reduces their (empirical) reach and 
explanatory value (cf., Lijphart 1971).  
In the second group, (narrow) patterns, typologies are often built on systematic studies that 
focus on a confined number of compliance motivations, and sophisticated statistical data analysis 
techniques are used to arrive at typologies that best fit the compliance data collected. Whilst less 
elegant than the typologies in the first group (cf., Van der Berg 2003), their value lies in their 
analytical rigour. These typologies, however, face critiques as well (May 2005; Parker & Nielsen 
2009): They often rely on (self-reported) survey data, and the validity of such data is questioned 
because it relies on the willingness of regulatees to provide trustworthy insights regarding their 
compliance behaviour—a highly sensitive issue (Cialdini 2003; Elffers et al. 1987). 
Whilst appreciating and being inspired by both sets of typologies, we wonder if another 
approach to studying compliance helps to address the weaknesses discussed. This was a relevant 
question when we began a study on Chinese farmers’ compliance with pesticide regulation in 2011. 
We selected qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) for our data analysis—informed by earlier 
experience with the method (Anonymous 2009; 2015a)—because it helps us to better understand 
situations in which conjunctural caustation and equifinality are at play, and in which an in-depth 
understanding of a medium-size set of cases is sought through rich qualitative data (Ragin 2008; 
Rihoux & Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012). We have collected data though in-depth 
interviews, aiming to overcome the validity problem discussed. 
In this article, we present the key findings from our study. We find that motivations that 
explain compliance are not always the inverse of motivations that explain non-compliance. This goes 
against an implicit assumption in the literature and many dominant typologies, i.e., that compliance 
and non-compliance are symmetrically influenced by compliance motivations. We find a specific 
cluster of motivations that indeed affects compliance and non-compliance symmetrically—the 
combination of law as a source of moral authority, descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive 
cost benefit analysis. However, for an important compliance motivation—the deterrent effect of 
sanctions—we find an asymmetric relation with compliance.  
The article unfolds as follows. The following section discusses the motivations that recur in 
the literature as related to compliance and non-compliance, and it further explores the two groups 
of typologies. We then introduce the research design of our study. Next, we present the main 
findings on compliant and non-compliant farmers. We conclude with a discussion of the implications 
for compliance theorising and insights on the method applied—including how it helps to address 
some of the shortfalls of dominant compliance typologies. 
 
Understanding compliance: motivations and typologies 
Compliance studies have moved well beyond the traditional deterrence model that was in vogue 
until the 1980s. It held that compliance results from a fear of the consequences of being found in 
violation of the law (Hawkins 1984; Reiss 1984). More recently, scholars have pointed towards a 
broader suite of interacting motivations that may explain compliant and non-compliant behaviour. A 
number of these motivations are dominant in the literature. 
 A first cluster of compliance motivations considers whether regulatees are able to comply. 
After all, they may lack the capacity to comply because of their physical characteristics or economic 
circumstances (Greer & Downey 1981; Winter & May 2001). They may further lack the legal 
knowledge required to comply (Winter & May 2001). A large body of literature on legal literacy and 
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legal awareness has developed which seeks to understand how governmental and other actors can 
improve regulatees’ legal knowledge (Fletcher et al. 2005; Williams 2005). 
 A second cluster of motivations considers the deterrent effect of sanctions. It holds that the 
threat of sanctions motivates regulatees to comply with legal and regulatory requirements (Becker & 
Stigler 1974; Hawkins 1984; Thornton et al. 2005). Expanding this traditional view (Hawkins 1984), 
this threat is now often unpacked as a (perceived) probability of being found in violation, a 
(perceived) probability of being sanctioned when found in violation, and a (perceived) sanction 
impact (Kirk & Hawkins 1986; Nagin 2013). Following on from such insights, scholars consider 
procedural justice another motivation for compliance (Tyler 1990). The day-to-day aspects of how 
legal and regulatory requirements are being implemented affect the willingness of regulatees to 
comply, such as the interaction between the regulator and the regulatee, or the experienced 
fairness of an enforcement decision by an authority (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). 
 A third cluster of motivations considers the impact of descriptive social norms. This part of 
the literature holds that regulatees conform to a social norm regarding compliance (Deutsch & 
Gerald 1955). If they experience that a legal or regulatory requirement is generally complied with, 
then they will do so too; yet if they experience that it is generally not complied with, then they will 
not comply with it either (Scholz & Lubell 1999; Tyran & Feld 2002).  
A fourth cluster of motivations considers how regulatees have internalised compliance. On 
the one hand, it considers that compliance results from regulatees’ perception of law as a source of 
moral authority (Tyler 1990)—morals in support of the law. Legal and regulatory requirements are 
considered to shape and strengthen one’s moral understanding of what is right and wrong. If such 
requirements are considered legitimate, this part of the literature argues, compliance will follow. On 
the other hand, it considers regulatees’ general duty to obey (McGraw & Scholz 1991; Van der Berg 
2003): Legal and regulatory requirements are complied with simply because doing so is required.  
 Closely related to all this, a fifth and final cluster of motivations considers that regulatees—
whether aware of it or not—carry out a cost-benefit analysis of their compliance behaviour (Ehrlich 
1972): If the benefits of complying outweigh its costs, they will comply; otherwise, they will not (but 
see Anonymous, 2015b). 
 What is of specific interest about this part of the literature is that it assumes symmetry: If a 
motivation is present, then compliance is expected to follow; if it is not present then violation is 
expected to follow. This assumed compliance–non-compliance dichotomy is however not often 
empirically scrutinised. 
 
Broad ideal types and (narrow) patterns 
Inspired by these motivations, and understanding that it is unlikely that a single motivation best 
explains compliance, scholars often develop typologies of compliance motivations when seeking to 
explain compliance behaviour. These typologies can, broadly, be clustered in two groups. The first 
group presents broad theoretical ‘ideal types’. The types in it are often loosely based on the 
compliance motivations introduced above (e.g., Braithwaite 2009; Kagan & Scholtz 1984; Kirchler et 
al. 2008). A well-known example of the first group is Kagan and Scholtz’s (1984) typology, which 
distinguishes: ‘amoral calculators’—firms that only comply when it is in their own economic 
advantage; ‘political citizens’—firms that comply because they agree with the goals of the law or 
simply because it is the law; and ‘organisationally incompetent’—firms that are willing to comply, 
but fail to do so because they do not know the law or lack the required internal controls. A fourth 
type was added by Black (1996)—‘irrational non-compliers’—referring to those who do not comply 
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because they reject the authority of the law or of those in power. Table 1 gives examples of 
typologies that fit this group. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
 In the second group, typologies build on a selected number of motivations, and they are 
often the result of large-n quantitative studies (e.g., Hutter 1997; Lehmann Nielsen & Parker 2012; 
May 2004; Tyler 1990). A well-known example of the second group is Lehmann Nielsen and Parker’s 
(2012) study of Australian firms. It applies a cluster analysis to derive a typology of compliance 
motivations. Building on economic, social and normative motives to comply (abstracted from a 
larger set of compliance motivations), it arrives at a typology of: ‘social citizens’—firms that want to 
comply and pursue their own economic and societal interests; ‘good citizens’—firms that are like the 
social citizens, but they downplay the priority social motivations to comply and agree less than that 
group with the substantive goals behind the law; and ‘dissenters’—firms that again look very much 
like the first group, but disagree with the goals of the law. Table 2 gives an overview of a number of 
other typologies that fit this group. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Both groups of typologies have their own strengths—and weaknesses. The first group holds 
highly inclusive typologies that are (theoretically) applicable to a wide range of settings and often 
come with appealing terminology. This makes them attractive as a heuristic for scholars and 
policymakers when assessing compliance. They may, however, be critiqued for lacking 
methodological rigour and empirical reach (May 2005; Parker & Nielsen 2009). The analytical step 
made from the underlying data to the typologies in this set often appears intuitive, rather than 
systematic. Compliance behaviour is considered ‘holistically’; it is not based on a specified (limited) 
set of motivations—or the interactions between them. Also, the oft small to medium-n database 
underlying these studies limits the reach of these studies: Whilst the types they present may inspire 
studies in other contexts, it is unlikely that they have much predictive power for such contexts (cf., 
Lijphart 1971)  
The typologies in the second group build on a predefined set of compliance motivations, and 
they apply sophisticated statistical analysis techniques to provide a clear link between data and 
typology. The large-n databases and the methodological rigour add to the empirical reach of such 
typologies. They may, however, be critiqued for the type of data upon which they rely: (self-
reported) survey data, government collected data, and, sometimes, observations. The data reliability 
of such sources is questioned (Cialdini 2003; Elffers et al. 1987), which negatively affects the validity 
of the typologies in this second group (May 2005; Parker & Nielsen 2009). These typologies may also 
provide an unrealistic view of compliance when the studies underlying them aim to understand 
which (single) type best explains compliance: The often small number of compliance motivations 
selected for inclusion in a study (see table 2) runs the risk of resulting in a narrow understanding of 
compliance behaviour. A typology then may create the illusion that compliance is simply a journey 
through (a small number of) predetermined or fixed behavioural patterns (e.g., Lee 2008). 
Both groups of typologies assume mutual exclusivity: An individual regulatee fits only one 
compliance type and not another. For typologies in the first group this is often an assumption 
logically inferred from the data; for the second group this is a result from the method chosen. Like 
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the assumed compliance–non-compliance dichotomy identified before this assumed mutual 





As indicated in the introduction, we have selected QCA to analyse our dataset of Chinese farmers’ 
compliance with or violation of pesticide regulation because it is particularly suited to trace patterns 
of association between interacting conditions (compliance motivations) and the outcome of interest 
(compliance or non-compliance), whilst relying on in-depth qualitative data. The fundamentals and 
background of QCA are well explained and documented in a series of textbooks (Ragin 2008; Rihoux 
& Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012) and also in the growing literature on ‘two cultures of 
research’ (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Goertz & Mahony 2012; Moses & Knutsen 2012). We therefore only 
focus on the core aspects of QCA that we consider necessary for readers to follow our analysis. 
 QCA differs from other methods in its focus. ‘The key issue [for QCA] is not which variable is 
the strongest (i.e., has the biggest net effect) but how different conditions combine and whether 
there is only one combination or several different combinations of conditions (causal recipes) of 
generating the same outcome’ (Ragin 2008, p. 114).1 QCA is grounded in set theory, a branch of 
mathematical logic that allows the study, in detail, of how causal conditions contribute to a 
particular outcome. A particular strength of QCA is that it can be applied to arrive at evidence-based 
typologies (cf., Fiss 2011).2 
 QCA has rapidly evolved: Various data analysis techniques are now available under the larger 
QCA umbrella (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). We apply crisp set qualitative comparative analysis 
(csQCA) developed first—a binary technique. More sophisticated techniques are now available that 
allow the use of more nuanced qualitative differences in data—multi-value and fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (mvQCA and fsQCA, see further, Schneider & Wagemann 2012). When we 
designed our research in 2011, we chose csQCA for two reasons. First, the outcomes we are 
interested in are binary: compliance or non-compliance. Second, most of the compliance 
motivations we are interested are fairly complex as interviewees may experience subtle differences 
in how they affect them (particularly for the latter three clusters). Because the majority of our 
interviewees (farmers) have a very basic level of education or none at all we were somewhat 
concerned they would get lost in too complex questions that allow for teasing out subtle differences. 
We therefore asked questions that aimed for extensive answers, but also allowed for responses 
(broadly) along the line of yes/no, a little/much, high/low, legal/illegal, gets punished/gets not 
punished, and so on. The answers collected were, indeed, often very basic and allowed for binary 
coding only for most of the motivations studied (for all clusters, but the first). 
For those less familiar with QCA, an explanation of the terminology may be helpful. Within 
QCA, types of interacting conditions (compliance motivations) are referred to as ‘paths’, and a full 
typology is referred to as a ‘solution’. Whilst QCA uses numerical symbols, it is a qualitative method. 
The numerical information provided throughout this article is a description of data patterns that 
                                                          
1 Regression analysis may be applied to a similar end; Vis (2012) and Warren et.al. (2013) contrast QCA with 
regression analysis, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
2 Cluster analysis may be applied to a similar end; Cooper and Glaesser (2011) contrast QCA with cluster 
analysis, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
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underlie the dataset, not simplistic reductions of the qualitative data obtained (cf., Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012). A ‘consistency score’, for instance, indicates how well a path and the full solution 
reflect the data; a ‘coverage score’ indicates how much of the data is explained by the paths and 
solution uncovered. 
In QCA, associations between conditions and outcomes are expressed in terms of necessity 
and sufficiency. Necessity refers to a situation in which the outcome (compliance) cannot be 
produced without the condition (a compliance motivation): If the outcome is present, the condition 
is present. Sufficiency refers to a situation in which a condition itself can produce the outcome 
without the help of other conditions—humans need oxygen to sustain life (oxygen is a necessary 
condition for human life), but oxygen by itself is not sufficient to sustain life (food and water, for 
instance, are other necessary conditions). It goes without saying that QCA is not without criticism, 
and we reflect on problems we have experienced in the concluding section (see also, Emmenegger 
2012; Hug 2013; Rihoux & Marx 2013). 
 
Case selection, data collection 
Through our study, we seek to understand farmers’ compliance behaviour with pesticide regulation 
in China’s Hunan province. This province was chosen because it is a typical, traditional agricultural 
province in China and prior to the study we found no indications of farmer compliance being 
different in Hunan than in other provinces (Statistical Bureau of Hunan 2012)—that being said, we 
do not claim that Hunan province is perfectly representative for all agricultural provinces in China.  
To gain insight into their compliance behaviour, 101 farmers were interviewed, as well as 31 
local experts to assess the validity of the farmer data. To capture the variation in the population of 
Hunan vegetable farmers, three counties were selected on the basis of vegetable yield and levels of 
economic development—one high income county producing for provincial markets; one middle 
income county producing for local county markets; and one low-income county producing for cross-
provincial markets. Within these counties, ten villages were selected—evenly distributed amongst 
the counties—based on accessibility, as well as the type of farms: small individual farms; medium to 
large cooperative forms of farming; and associated forms of farming. Farms were evenly distributed 
amongst the different villages. In each village, a sample size of farmers was determined relative to 
village population and age distribution.  
The study is influenced by Winter and May’s study of Danish farmers’ compliance behaviour 
(Winter & May 2001). In contrast to them, however, we did not rely on a survey, but on semi-
structured interviews with farmers, to overcome, as much as possible, the complications of studying 
and measuring compliance (cf., Elffers et al. 1987). We asked questions in a dialogue structure, 
allowing farmers to speak longer and more in-depth on issues of interest to them—including topics 
that were not necessarily the focus of the study. This allowed us to build trust and gave us time to 
embed more sensitive questions about compliance within non-sensitive questions about farming 
practices (Anonymous 2015). A large portion of farmers talked openly about non-compliance—13% 
told they violate pesticide type regulation, and 59% time interval regulation—indicating that they 
were comfortable enough to do so. 
In this article, we focus on two compliance behaviours: compliance with the types of 
pesticides farmers are allowed to use (O_type), and compliance with the time interval between 
using pesticides and harvesting crops (O_time). We address compliant and non-compliant behaviour 
(outcomes). Our focus is on eight compliance motivations (conditions) derived from the current 
literature: (i) capacity to comply, (ii) legal knowledge, (iii) deterrent effect of sanctions, (iv) cost-
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benefit analysis, (v) descriptive social norms, (vi) morals, (vii) general duty to obey, (viii) procedural 
justice.  
We found that the theoretical model of these eight conditions best explained our data—it 
resulted in the highest coverage scores—as compared to other models we trialled building on 
smaller sets of conditions and sets of eight slightly different conditions (cf., Schneider & Wagemann 
2012). Also, whilst the ceiling to the number of conditions that can be included in a csQCA analysis 
depends on the number of cases studied and the spread of the observations of the conditions 
selected (Marx & Dusa, 2011), we followed conventional csQCA practise that argues to limit studies 
to eight conditions (Rihoux & Ragin 2009). The number of possible configurations increases 
exponentially with each condition added (with k conditions the number of possible configurations is 
2k), but the number of empirical observations in a study is fixed—in our case compliance behaviour 
of 101 farmers. Thus, the more conditions added to the explanatory model, the more a QCA analysis 
relies on counterfactuals. That is, if a researcher decides to rely on counterfactuals from all 
conditions included—the method leaves it to the researcher to make that choice. In the 
simplification process of the QCA analyses we only rely on counterfactuals from conditions that, we 
feel, have been sufficiently studied and documented in the literature to give enough certainty about 
their impact on compliance and non-compliance—these are the conditions from the first two 
clusters (in other words, we rely on empirical observations and counterfactuals for capacity to 
comply, legal knowledge, deterrent effect of sanctions, and procedural justice; and on empirical 
observations exclusively for general duty to obey, morals, cost-benefit analysis, and descriptive 
social norms). We return to this issue in the concluding section. 
To measure compliance with the types of pesticides, farmers were asked to point out the 
pesticides they normally use on a chart of common legal and illegal pesticides for the Chinese 
context. To measure compliance with the time interval rules, we asked how many days there usually 
are between applying pesticides and harvesting the crops. We then moved to questions about 
motivations for particular compliance behaviour. To gain insight into the deterrent effect of 
sanctions, for example, we asked what could happen if someone like them did not comply with legal 
requirements, and what the severity of a sanction or punishment would be. The answers were coded 
separately for both compliance behaviours, and for the individual compliance motivations. Online 
Appendix A further discusses data-coding (table A1) and presents all data scores (the ‘raw data’; 
table A2 and table A3).3 
  
Compliant farmers 
We address compliance with types of pesticides first, followed by compliance with the time interval 
between pesticide application and harvesting. Following established QCA practice, the data are first 
analysed for necessary conditions, before they are exposed to more complex analysis to identify (the 
configurations of) sufficient conditions. 
  
Compliance with type of pesticides 
A test for necessity seeks to understand whether the outcome of interest can only be produced if a 
specific (combination of) condition(s) is present. Table 3 presents the results of the analysis for 
necessity. 
 
                                                          
3 LINK TO ONLINE APPENDIX HERE 
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conditions should only be considered necessary if their consistency scores are very high (consistency 
indicates how strongly the condition relates to the outcome); a cut-off point of 0.90 is advised 
(Rihoux & Ragin 2009, p. 45). Table 3 points to three such conditions: cost-benefit analysis, 
descriptive social norms, and morals. The relatively high coverage scores of these conditions indicate 
that they are likely necessary conditions for causing this outcome (coverage indicates how relevant 
the condition is for achieving the outcome). It is, of course, of interest to further understand 
whether these three necessary conditions combine with each other or with the other conditions for 
compliant famers (conjunctural causation), and whether a single combination of conditions or 
different combinations of conditions are related to compliant behaviour (equifinality). This is what 
we seek to understand by applying an analysis for sufficient conditions. 
 To gain insight into the issues of equifinality and conjunctural causation, the data are 
analysed aiming to logically reduce the empirically observed configurations (Rihoux & Ragin 2009, 
Chapter 5, box 8.1; Schneider & Wagemann 2012, Chapter 11). A first step of this analysis is to 
create a truth table, which is represented in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The truth table represents all configurations of conditions that are logically possible. With 
the eight conditions included in our study, the number of logically possible combinations is 256—
2^8. All 101 empirical observations (the farmers) are included in this table (rows 1 to 29)—each 
observation is unpacked as a configuration of conditions. Some configurations were observed for 
more than one farmer (e.g., row 1)—the number of observations per configuration (frequency) is 
indicated table 3. The truth table also includes possible configurations, but without empirical 
observations—the logical remainders in rows 30-256. 
The truth table is used for a logical minimisation of the data. Following Ragin (2008), only 
configurations with at least two observations are considered in the analysis, because of the relatively 
large datasets (also, Schneider & Wagemann 2012).4 From here on, a standard analysis is carried out 
in FS/QCA 2.5 (Ragin & Davey 2014). Table 5 represents the intermediate solution that results from 
this analysis. An intermediate solution includes counterfactuals in the minimisation process—we 
only use counterfactuals from the first two clusters of motivations, and rely on empirical 
observations exclusively for the other motivations (see research design). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 adopts a straightforward notation and presentation of causal configurations (‘paths’) 
that are sufficient to cause the outcome of interest. It indicates that two paths are related to 
compliant behaviour with the type of pesticides. The solution coverage (0.91) may be considered as 
high (Ragin 2008), and it indicates that the solution strongly relates to the outcome observed (see 
further, Schneider & Wagemann 2012, section 5.3). The solution consistency (1.00) is high as well, 
                                                          
4 We have carried out analyses with higher cut-off points. Whilst this resulted in simpler solutions, we felt they 
were too simple to explain our data. Textbooks indeed warn researchers not to blindly apply the computer 
software and the solutions it produces. Whilst less complex solutions might have intuitive appeal, they in fact 
are less precise in explaining the data (cf., Rihoux & Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012). 
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and it indicates that the solution is of high empirical importance in reaching the outcome. The two 
paths can be considered as two causal recipes that are individually sufficient to cause the outcome. 
Interestingly, all three necessary conditions combine in both paths, which means that we can also 
formulate the full solution as: 
 
     gdto 
Outcome O_type  ->   mora*socn*cba* +       
 lega*dete      (1) 
 
 
In this formula, the multiply symbol (‘*’) represents the logical AND, and the sum symbol (‘+’) 
represents the logical OR. The above formula (1) can be read as: compliance with the regulation 
prescribing the type of pesticides farmers are allowed to use is found in farmers who report: 
 law as a source of moral authority, and descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive 
cost benefit analysis, and a general duty to obey (path O_type.1); or, 
 law as a source of moral authority, and descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive 
cost benefit analysis, and legal knowledge, and a deterrent effect of sanctions (path 
O_type.2). 
 
Table 5 indicates the farmers that fit each path: 67 farmers fit path O_type.1; 66 farmers fit 
path O_type.2; and 7 farmers indicate compliant behaviour, but do not fit either of these paths. 
Table 5 further indicates that 52 farmers fit both paths, confirming the idea that the analysis for 
sufficient conditions results in ideal types that explain compliant behaviour, and that farmers can 
empirically meet different ideal types (cf., Fiss 2011)—especially when the ideal types are fairly 
similar, which is the case in this part of our study.  
 
Compliance with time interval between pesticide application and harvesting 
Again, the data are analysed for necessary conditions before they are subjected to the more 
complex analysis for sufficient conditions. To prevent too much repetition in this article, we only 
present the outcomes of the analyses for necessary and sufficient conditions in what follows, as well 
as the simplified formulae. Additional data, particularly the truth tables underlying these analyses, 
are presented in Online Appendix B. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis for necessity, and 
table 7 shows the results of the analysis for sufficiency. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 indicates the likely necessary conditions for compliance with pesticide regulation: 
cost-benefit analysis, descriptive social norms, and morals. Table 7 indicates that three paths are 
related to this compliant behaviour (the solution coverage and consistency for the full solution are 






            gdto 
Outcome O_time  ->  mora*cba*lega*capa*~gdto     +     mora*socn*cba*      +   
          lega   (2) 
 
 
The above formula (2) can be read as: compliance with the regulation prescribing the time interval 
between applying pesticides and harvesting crops of pesticides is found in farmers who report: 
 law as a source of moral authority, and a positive cost benefit analysis, and legal knowledge, 
and a capacity to comply, and not a general duty to obey (path O_time.3); or,  
 law as a source of moral authority, and descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive 
cost benefit analysis, and a general duty to obey (path O_time.1); or, 
 law as a source of moral authority, and descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive 
cost benefit analysis, and legal knowledge (path O_time.2). 
 
Non-compliant farmers 
The literature often implicitly understands non-compliant behaviour as the inverse of compliant 
behaviour. After interviewing 101 farmers and roughly analysing our data through a systematic 
coding practice, we felt that the assumption that ‘compliance is the inverse of non-compliance’ 
might be too simplistic. Following this theory and data-informed ‘hunch’ (cf., Kahneman 2011; 
Layder 2006), we decided to subject our data on non-compliance to a csQCA analysis as well, seeking 
to understand whether the motivations mentioned by compliant farmers were the inverse of 
motivations mentioned by non-compliant farmers. For instance, the presence of three conditions 
(law as a source of moral authority, descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive cost benefit 
analysis) were found in most paths in section 4, and we wondered whether they were absent (the 
inverse of present) for farmers that reported non-compliant behaviour. In QCA the ‘~’ symbol is used 
to indicate ‘inverse’. In this section, we follow the same analytical techniques and choices made in 
section 4. 
 
Non-compliance with types of pesticides 
Table 8 presents the results of the analysis for necessary conditions, and table 9 shows the results of 
the analysis for sufficient conditions. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
From table 8, it becomes clear that four conditions may be necessary for non-compliance: 
the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions, a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, the absence of 
(experienced) descriptive social norms, and the absence of (an experience of) the morals. The 
relatively low coverage scores of the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions and a non-positive 




Table 9 indicates that two paths are related to non-compliant behaviour with the type of 
pesticides. The solution coverage (0.62) may be considered as modest (Ragin 2008), and it indicates 
that the solution leaves a part of the observed outcome unexplained – i.e., the solution only explains 
the behaviour of seven out of thirteen famers who reported non-compliant behaviour. The solution 
consistency (1.00) can be considered as high, but it is of less relevance here, because the solution 
coverage is only modest (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). Whilst the two paths are both fairly 
complex (including five conditions), they can be further reduced in the following formula: 
 
 
             ~capa 
Outcome ~O_type  ->   ~mora*~socn*~cba*~dete*~proj       +      
        ~gdto     (3) 
 
 
The above formula (3) can be read as: non-compliance with the regulation prescribing the type of 
pesticides farmers are allowed to use is found in farmers who report: 
 the absence of morals in favour of compliance, and the absence of (experienced) descriptive 
social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of a deterrent effect 
of sanctions, and an absence of (experienced) procedural justice, and a lack of capacity to 
comply (path ~O_type.1); or, 
 the absence of morals in favour of compliance, and the absence of (experienced) descriptive 
social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of a deterrent effect 
of sanctions, and an absence of (experienced) procedural justice, and a lack of a(n 
experienced) general duty to obey the law (~path O_type.2).   
 
What is of interest here is that the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions is a necessary condition 
for non-compliance. In other words, this particular condition plays out differently for compliance and 
non-compliance: There appears to be an asymmetrical relation between the presence/absence of 
this condition and compliance/non-compliance. The other necessary conditions (morals, descriptive 
social norms, cost-benefit analysis) do appear to have a symmetrical relation with compliance. 
 
Non-compliance with time interval between pesticide application and harvesting 
Table 10 presents the results of the analysis for necessary conditions, and table 11 shows the results 
for sufficient conditions. 
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
From table 10, it becomes clear that four conditions may be necessary for non-compliance: the 
absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions, a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, the absence of 
(experienced) descriptive social norms, and the absence of (an experience of) procedural justice. The 
relatively low coverage scores of the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions and the absence of 
(an experience of) procedural justice may indicate that they are trivial necessary conditions. 
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 Table 11 indicates that three paths are related to compliant behaviour with the type of 
pesticides (the solution coverage and consistency for the full solution are high), which can be 
simplified as: 
     ~dete                  ~lega 
Outcome ~O_time  ->  ~socn*~cba*~proj      +       +      ~mora*~socn*~cba*~dete*~capa         + 
     gdto             ~gdto   (4) 
 
 
The above formula (4) can be read as: non-compliance with the regulation prescribing the time 
interval between applying pesticides and harvesting crops of pesticides is found in farmers who 
report: 
 the absence of (experienced) descriptive social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit 
analysis, and a lack of capacity to comply, and a lack of (an experience of) procedural justice, 
and the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions (path ~O_time.3); or, 
  the absence of (experienced) descriptive social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit 
analysis, and a lack of capacity to comply, and a lack of (an experience of) procedural justice, 
and a general duty to obey the law (path ~O_time.4); or, 
 the absence of morals in favour of compliance, and the absence of (experienced) descriptive 
social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of a deterrent effect 
of sanctions, and a lack of capacity to comply, and a lack of legal knowledge (path 
~O_time.1); or, 
 the absence of morals in favour of compliance, and the absence of (experienced) descriptive 
social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of a deterrent effect 
of sanctions, and a lack of capacity to comply, and a lack of a(n experienced) general duty to 
obey the law (~path O_time.2). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The above analyses have indicated that compliance motivations interact in compliant and non-
compliant behaviour (conjunctural causation) and that different configurations of compliance 
motivations can result in compliant and non-compliant behaviour (equifinality)—at least for the 
behaviour of the 101 farmers interviewed. That equifinality and conjunctural causation are at play is, 
however, the least interesting of our findings: Because csQCA is developed to better understand 
equifinality and conjunctural causation, among other things, this likely is ‘uncovered’ when suitable 
data are subjected to the analyses for necessity and sufficiency—all the more when the data are 
collected based on claims and empirical findings in support of (assumed) equifinality and 
conjunctural causation (as was the case for our study).  
What is of more interest is that the analyses for sufficiency point out a limited number of 
paths that explain the two compliance behaviours we have studied in our pool of 101 farmers. We 
only find two paths for compliance with the type of pesticides farmers are allowed to use, and only 
three paths for compliance with the time interval between applying pesticides and harvesting crops. 
Keeping in mind that, for each of the two compliance behaviours, 256 paths are logically possible 
with the eight motivations we focus on, this truly is a considerable simplification. Yet again, this 
empirical finding is particularly a result of the method chosen. Our study does also point to a 
number of insights that contribute to theorizing on compliance behaviour and compliance 
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motivations. We discuss these in what follows. Yet, because these insights should be understood in 
light of the limitations (and opportunities) that come with the method applied, we discuss those 
first.  
 
Observations on the method applied: Opportunities and limitations 
In applying csQCA we experience a number of advantages: It helps to highlight equifinality and 
conjunctural causation of interacting compliance motivations, it allows us to study compliance and 
non-compliance, it provides a systematic approach to move from data to findings, and it allows the 
use of data on compliance motivations obtained through in-depth interviews. We are further 
positive about how it helps to get grip on this (qualitative) data: The tables presenting the analyses 
for sufficient conditions help to identify typical and atypical cases and patterns (Ragin & Becker 
1992; Yin 2003). Table 5, for example, identifies the ‘typical’ farmers that fit the two compliance 
types, as well as the seven ‘atypical’ farmers that do not fit them—the ‘unexplained cases’. It further 
helps to identify the 51 farmers that fit both types, and the famers that fit one type uniquely. In 
particular, the identification of ‘atypical’ farmers is of interest, because these specific farmers do not 
fully fit the theoretical model used—the eight compliance motivations. A better understanding of 
their behaviour might help to enrich the compliance literature further, and a logical next step of our 
study is to focus uniquely on them (cf., Layder 2006). 
That being said in praise of csQCA for compliance studies, the method also comes with 
specific complications, and these should not be taken lightly. First, by following a highly systematic 
approach to data analysis, csQCA challenges scholars to move beyond intuitive interpretations. The 
downside, of course, is that the paths related to compliance that we have presented here are fairly 
difficult to read, and we expect that they will be all the more so for a non-academic audience, such 
as policymakers and practitioners. We did not experience the risk of slavishly applying the method to 
‘mine’ data, but we agree with the literature that this risk exists—perhaps we were in the fortunate 
position that we could use data we know very well because we collected it ourselves (for further 
published critiques of QCA see, Emmenegger 2012; Hug 2013; Rihoux & Marx 2013). 
More problematic is the reliance on counterfactuals—albeit this is a general critique of QCA 
(Emmenegger 2012). In our study, we built on eight compliance conditions. Together, they allow for 
256 possible configurations—2^8. However, our data identified much smaller sets of empirically 
observed configurations—only 29 for compliance with type of pesticides. We felt comfortable 
enough with the literature on the first two clusters of compliance motivations to rely on 
counterfactuals (capacity to comply, legal knowledge, deterrence effect of sanction, and procedural 
justice), but not with the literature on the last three clusters (descriptive social norms, morals, 
general duty to obey, cost-benefit analysis, see further Anonymous 2015b). For the latter we have 
relied on empirical observations uniquely—QCA allows researchers, after all, also to not rely on 
counterfactuals if they are concerned about these (see also research design).5 Whilst relying on 
counterfactual is a conventional approach in QCA—and for many other data analysis techniques—it 
also implies that the findings from our study are strongly influenced by assumptions in the 
compliance literature (but only for those motivations we use as counterfactuals).  
 
Theoretical contribution 
                                                          
5 We are in depth to both reviewers for challenging us to critically think about and reflect on the use of 
counterfactuals in this study. 
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Our study has implications for assessing the value of typologies discussed above. First, all of the 
paths (types) we identified are fairly complex, including, at the very least, four different compliance 
motivations. For the typologies building on large-n studies—characterised as ‘(narrow) patterns’—
this supports existing critique that they may include too small a number of explanatory variables 
(compliance motivations) to provide an adequate insight into what explains compliance in real world 
settings (also, May 2005; Parker & Nielsen 2009)—but again, the number of motivations we relied 
on (eight) comes with its own methodological complications (see above). 
The group of typologies characterised as ‘ideal types’ appear more problematic. The various 
paths related to compliance identified in our study can be understood as evidence-based ideal types 
(Fiss, 2011), but none of them can be easily captured in catchy sound bites such as the ideal types 
illustrated in table 1. We do not argue against these sound bites, but against the often unexplained 
inferential step from data to types in these studies. Without a systematic approach to data analysis, 
small-n studies may become subject to a desire to present overly stylised typologies (also, May 2005; 
Parker & Nielsen 2009). The problem with such typologies becomes clear, for instance, if we contrast 
our two paths for compliant behaviour with pesticide types (path O_type.1, resembling 67 farmers; 
and path O_type.2, resembling 61 farmers) with Kircher et al.’s (2008) well-known slippery slope 
model (see Figure 1). These two paths resemble two types in that model: voluntary compliance and 
enforced compliance. These two terms indicate mutually exclusive types—and one would assume 
from them that regulatees either fit the ‘voluntary’ or the ‘enforced’ type. However, in our study, we 
found that 52 farmers fit both types—indicating equifinality at the individual regulatee level.  
Our study has implications also for thinking about compliance and non-compliance more 
generally. We find considerable similarities and relevant differences in the paths related to 
compliant behaviour (O_type and O_time) and non-compliant behaviour (~O_type and ~O_time). In 
terms of similarity: the presence of the combination of mora*socn*cba (law as a source of moral 
authority, and descriptive social norms to comply, and a positive cost benefit analysis) in four of the 
five paths uncovered for compliant behaviour (all but O_time.3) is mirrored by the combination of 
~mora*~socn*~cba (the absence of morals in favour of compliance, and the absence of descriptive 
social norms, and a non-positive cost-benefit analysis) in four of the six paths uncovered for non-
compliant behaviour (all but ~O_time.3 and ~O_time.4). This indicates that this cluster of conditions 
can be considered as symmetrical in affecting compliance and non-compliance within the pool of 
farmers studied. This symmetrical relationship between compliance and non-compliance is assumed 
in the literature, but is not often empirically observed. 
However, our data also point to a non-symmetrical relation between the deterrent effect of 
sanctions and compliance. The analyses of necessary conditions pointed out that (experienced) 
deterrence is not a necessary condition for compliance, but that the absence of (experienced) 
deterrence is a necessary condition for non-compliance (all paths, but ~O_time.4). Our data further 
indicate that deterrence (as part of a set of compliance conditions) does play a marginal role in 
affecting compliance (in one path for one compliance behaviour), the absence of deterrence does, 
however, play a considerable role in affecting non-compliance (in five out of six paths for both non-
compliance behaviours). This finding challenges our thinking about the assumed compliance–non-
compliance dichotomy in the literature—it indicates that compliance is not necessarily the inverse of 
non-compliance.  
Whilst it may seem counterintuitive that compliant and non-compliant behaviour are not 
different sides of the same (motivational) coin, there is a (theoretical) explanation. Building on our 
study, we argue that, in compliance decision making, deterrence plays a different role than in 
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violation decision making. Decision making, we feel, is key here. Deciding to comply is not the same 
as (also) deciding ‘not to violate’—if we decide to stick to speed limits, we likely do not (also) decide 
to not hit the pedal to the metal (building on insights from behavioural economics, cf., Kahneman 
2011). What we observe is not a reassurance and reminder function for compliant decision making 
from deterrence, but the lack of deterrence as a reminder and reassurance that violation goes 
unnoticed or unpunished (terminology from: Thornton et al. 2005)—or less prosaic, perhaps 
compliance simply is a habit for most of the farmers interviewed (cf., Duhigg 2012). This reasoning is 
in line with Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s (1992) responsive regulation model, which assumes 
that most compliance will occur without active deterrence. Indeed, those complying, the large 
majority of farmers interviewed, do not mention the presence of deterrence as a necessary 
condition of their behaviour—they sit at the base of the responsive regulation pyramid. 
This allows us to hypothesise that compliance and non-compliance are affected 
symmetrically only by specific motivations—but this hypothesis needs further testing to assess if it 
also holds for regulatees and in contexts other than in our study. Scholars may wish to fine tune 
their compliance studies by including this focus on motivations that affect compliance and violation 
symmetrically and non-symmetrically. A better understanding of such asymmetry may have 
important consequences for law enforcement: It may explain why in situations of non-compliance 
choosing the opposite enforcement and disciplining strategy (from the one in place) is no guarantee 
of improved compliance. 
To conclude, whilst acknowledging the limitations of csQCA, we feel it provides a valuable 
method to systematically analyse a large qualitative data set such as ours. It allowed us to critically 
scrutinize existing typologies of compliance motivations, and to empirically illustrate symmetry and 
asymmetry between compliance motivations and compliance behaviours (at least for our data set). 
We know of no other methods that allow for doing so with the relative ease of csQCA, and we 
expect that the available more sophisticated QCA techniques (mvQCA and fsQCA) assist scholars in 
gaining more nuanced understandings of what motivates compliance, how, and where. In sum, 
despite its methodological shortcomings we hope that our experience with (cs)QCA reported here 
inspires other scholars to apply it in future compliance studies. 
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Table 1 – Some well-known typologies resulting from small-n compliance studies 
Author (s) Specific 
regulatory 
context  







Amoral calculation Motivated by profit-seeking 
Principled 
agreement 
Motivated by belief in the rule of law or long-
term interests 




Tax regulation Commitment Motivated by moral obligation 
Capitulation Motivated by an acceptance of the authority as 
a legitimate power to pursue the collective’s 
goals 
Resistance Motivated by doubts about the authority 
Disengagement Motivated by ignorance of the authority and the 
law 
Game playing Motivated by seeking possibilities to increase 
the regulated entities’ own interests 
Kirchler 
(2008)  
Tax regulation Voluntary 
compliance 
Motivated by high trust of the authority 
Enforced 
compliance 
Motivated by low trust of the authority, but 
strong power of the authority to effectively 
audit and sanction non-compliant behaviour 
Tax avoidance  Motivated by intention to reduce taxes within 
the legal range of the law but deterred from 
illegal reductions 
Tax evasion Motivated by both low trust in authority and 





Table 2 – Some well-known large-n compliance studies 
Author (s) Specific regulatory context  Compliance conditions studied 
A B C D E F G  
Tyler (1990) General regulation   x  x x x  
Hutter (1997) Occupational health and safety 
(England and Wales) 
  x  x x   
Winter & May (2001) Agro-environmental (Denmark) 
 
x x x   x   
May (2004) Building safety (United States) x x x  x x   
Paternoster & Simpson 
(1993) 
Corporate regulatory context   x x x x   
Thornton et al.(2005) Corporate environmental regulation 
(United States, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand) 
  x x  x   
Nielsen & Parker 
(2012) 
Corporate compliance (Australia) x  x x x x x  
Note: A = ability to obey the law; B = legal knowledge; C = deterrent effect of sanctions; D = descriptive social 
norms; E = morals; F = general duty to obey; G = procedural justice – see further section 2.2. 
 
 
Table 3 – Necessary conditions outcome O_type  
Condition Consistency Coverage 
Capacity to comply (capa) 0.35 0.86 
Legal knowledge (lega) 0.90* 0.86 
Deterrent effect of sanctions (dete) 0.82 0.99 
Cost-benefit analysis (cba) 0.93 1.00 
Descriptive social norms (socn) 0.97 1.00 
Morals (mora) 1.00 0.99 
Duty to obey (gdto) 0.76 0.91 
Procedural justice (proj) 0.08 0.79 





Table 4 – Truth table for outcome O_type 
Row Conditions Freq. O_ 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  Type 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 21 1 
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 12 1 
4 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 
5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 1 
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 
10 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
11 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
12 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
13 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
14 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
15 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
16 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
17 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
18 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
19 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
23 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
26 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
28 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Rows 30 – 256: logical remainders 227 ? 
Abbreviations: capa=capacity to comply; lega=legal knowledge; dete=deterrent effect of sanctions; cba=cost-






Table 5 – Intermediate solution outcome O_type 





-> Compliance (type 
of pesticides) 
Raw coverage 0.72  0.76   
Unique coverage 0.15  0.19   
Consistency 1.00  1.00   
Cases 1; 4-6†; 8; 11-18; 
20-23; 27; 30; 32; 
35; 37; 44; 45; 49-
57; 59; 61-71; 74; 
75; 77-83; 85; 86; 
90-98; 100; 101 
 1; 4-6; 8-18; 20-22; 
26; 35; 37; 41; 42; 







    3; 24; 25; 28; 48; 
58; 88 
Total cases 67 farmers in total  66 farmers in total  7 farmers in total 
   Solution coverage: 0.91 
   Solution consistency: 1.00 
Abbreviations: as per table 4. 
† Please note, we only use the ‘-‘ symbol to reduce space; not to indicate any relationship between these 
farmers (but for the fact that they fit the specific path). 
†† Farmers that do show compliance, but that do not fit either of the two paths identified. 
 
Table 6 – Necessary conditions outcome O_time 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
Capacity to comply (capa) 0.41 0.47 
Legal knowledge (lega) 0.75 0.52 
Deterrent effect of sanctions (dete) 0.27 1.00 
Cost-benefit analysis (cba) 1.00 1.00 
Descriptive social norms (socn) 0.95 0.98 
Morals (mora) 1.00 0.62 
Duty to obey (gdto) 0.68 0.38 





Table 7 – Intermediate solution outcome O_time 





+ mora*cba*lega*capa -> Compliance 
(time interval) 
Raw coverage 0.68  0.71  0.37   
Unique coverage 0.24  0.17  0.05   
Consistency 1.00  1.00  1.00   
Cases  7; 15; 27; 28; 32; 
35; 37; 44; 47; 
49-52; 54; 56; 57; 
62; 65-69; 85; 96-
98; 100; 101 
 9; 10; 25; 26; 33; 
35; 37; 44; 46; 
47; 49-51; 53; 55; 
56; 60; 62; 62; 
66-68; 96-101 
 2; 7; 9; 10; 25; 38; 
47; 49; 68; 96-101 
  
Unexplained cases       No unexplained 
cases 
Total cases 28 farmers in 
total 
 27 farmers in 
total 
 15 farmers in total   
     Solution coverage: 1.00 
     Solution consistency: 1.00 
Abbreviations: as per table 4. 
Table 8 – Necessary conditions outcome ~O_type (non-compliance) 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
~Capacity to comply (capa) 0.62 0.12 
~Legal knowledge (lega) 0.08 0.10 
~Deterrent effect of sanctions (dete) 0.92 0.44 
~Cost-benefit analysis (cba) 1.00 0.68 
~Descriptive social norms (socn) 1.00 0.87 
~Morals (mora) 0.92 1.00 
~Duty to obey (gdto) 0.46 0.22 
~Procedural justice (proj) 0.77 0.11 
The symbol ‘~’ indicates the absence of the condition. 
 
Table 9 – Intermediate solution outcome ~O_type (non-compliance) 






(type of pesticides) 
Raw coverage 0.46  0.31   
Unique coverage 0.31  0.15   
Consistency 1.00  1.00   
Cases 29; 31; 34; 39; 40; 43  2; 29; 38; 40   
Unexplained cases     7; 19; 33; 36; 47 
Total cases 6 farmers in total  4 farmers in total  5 farmers in total 
   Solution coverage: 0.62 
   Solution consistency: 1.00 
Abbreviations: as per table 4 




Table 10 – Necessary conditions outcome ~O_time (non-compliance) 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
~Capacity to comply (capa) 0.68 0.63 
~Legal knowledge (lega) 0.52 0.76 
~Deterrent effect of sanctions (dete) 1.00 0.67 
~Cost-benefit analysis (cba) 1.00 1.00 
~Descriptive social norms (socn) 0.98 0.97 
~Morals (mora) 0.58 1.00 
~Duty to obey (gdto) 0.23 0.51 
~Procedural justice (proj) 0.92 0.60 
The symbol ‘~’ indicates the absence of the condition. 
 
Table 11 – Intermediate solution outcome ~O_time (non-compliance) 









Raw coverage 0.27  0.12  0.90   
Unique coverage 0.03  0.03  0.61   
Consistency 1.00  1.00  1.00   
Cases  43; 71; 73; 74; 77; 
78; 80-84; 86; 90; 
92; 94; 95  
 29; 36; 41; 48; 72; 
73; 84 
 1; 3-7; 13; 14; 16-24; 
29-31; 34; 39-43; 45; 
48; 58; 59; 61; 64; 
70; 71; 73-77; 79-82; 




      11; 12; 36 
Total cases 16 farmers in total  7 farmers in total  54 farmers in total  3 farmers in 
total 
     Solution coverage: 0.97 
     Solution consistency: 1.00 
Abbreviations: as per table 3. 





Table A1 Calibrating compliance conditions and outcomes for csQCA 





Use of types of 
pesticides 
Which pesticides do you usually 
use on what vegetables for what 
pests or diseases? 
In any way indicates 
that he/she has applied 
or will apply any type of 
illegal pesticides  
Does not indicate in any 
way that he/she has 
applied or will apply any 
type of illegal pesticides  
Time interval What is your general time 
interval between the last 
pesticide applying and vegetable 
pick-up? 
In any way indicate that 
he/she generally 
harvests vegetable at 
least a week later after 
pesticide spraying 
In any way indicate that 
he/she generally 
harvests vegetable 






(Winter & May 
2001; Kagan & 
Scholz 1984) 
What was your family gross 
earning last year? 
In any way indicates 
family gross income < 
40,000 RMB  
In any way indicates 
family income >40,000 
RMB 
    
Legal 
knowledge 
(Winter & May 
2001; Kim 
1999) 
Do you know if the state has 
published any rules on (use of 
types of pesticides/disposal of 
pesticide containers/time 
interval)? If yes, please specify. 
How do you know this? 
In any way indicates 
irrelevant legal 





interval) from the 
law/other sources 
In any way indicates 
relevant legal 





interval) from the 
law/other sources 





Thornton et al. 
2005; Winter 
& May 2001) 
Assume that someone in the 
same business area as you does 
violate regulatory requirements 
related to [the type of pesticides 
that he is allowed to use/the 
time interval between applying 
pesticides and harvesting crops].  
What is the possibility of this 
being found out? How high is 
the possibility? By whom? What 
negative and most serious 
effects would happen if 
punished?  
In any way indicates 
low possibility of being 
discovered by the 
inspection 
bureau/other sources 
as well as no sanction 
impact 
In any way indicates 
high possibility of being 
discovered by the 
inspection bureau/other 





Table A1 – Continued 








Winter & May 
2001) 
How is your behavior (legal or 
illegal) in comparison with the 
alternatives (illegal or legal) in 
terms of price and effectiveness 
(for use of types of pesticides)/ 
cost and earnings (for a time 
interval)? 
In any way indicates 
comparing with the 
violation behavior, any 
of the two specific 
compliance behaviors is 
less/more costly and 
less effective/profitable  
In any way indicates 
comparing with the 
violation behavior, any 
of the two specific 
compliance behaviors is 
less/more costly and 
more 
effective/profitable 




Tyran & Feld 
2002) 
Do most other vegetable 
farmers do the same as you do 
on (any of the three specific 
behaviors)? 
In any way indicates 
that most other 
vegetable farmers do 
not comply with the 
rules on (any of the 
three specific pesticide 
behaviors) 
In any way indicates 
that most other 
vegetable farmers 
comply with the rules 
on (any of the three 
specific pesticide 
behaviors) 
    
Morals (Tyler 
1990) 
How do you think of people who 
do [any of the two specific 
violation behaviors]? 
In any way indicates in 
such conditions the law 
should not be obeyed 
In any way indicates in 
such conditions the law 
should be obeyed 
    
General duty 
to obey (Tyler 
1990; McGraw 
& Scholz 1991) 
Do you agree with the following 
statement: people should obey 
the law, even if it is a bad law, 
even if it is not enforced, or 
even when costs of obeying it 
are high? 
In any way indicates 
negative views on 
general duty to obey 
In any way indicates 
positive views on 
general duty to obey 




Do you agree with the following 
statements: officers of the local 
agricultural bureau are honest; 
decisions of local agricultural 
bureau are always fair; overall, 
how do you assess the work of 
the local agricultural bureau? 
In any way indicates 
negative views or mixed 
views toward the three 
aspects concerning 
procedural justice 
In any way indicates 
positive views toward all 







Table A2 – Raw data matrix for compliance with type of regulation 
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
7 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
19 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
23 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
25 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
26 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
27 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
28 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
32 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
35 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
36 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
37 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
38 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
42 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
43 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 




Table A2 – Continued  
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
45 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
46 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
47 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
48 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
50 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
51 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
52 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
53 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
54 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
55 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
56 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
57 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
58 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
59 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
60 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
61 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
62 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
63 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
64 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
65 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
66 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
67 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
68 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
69 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
70 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
71 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
72 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
73 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
74 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
75 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
76 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
77 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
78 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
79 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
80 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
81 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
82 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
83 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
84 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
85 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
86 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
87 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 




Table A2 – Continued  
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
89 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
90 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
91 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
92 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
93 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
94 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
95 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
96 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
97 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
99 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
101 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Abbreviations: capa=capacity to comply; lega=legal knowledge; dete=deterrent effect of sanctions; cba=cost-






Table A3 – Raw data matrix for compliance with time interval 
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
3 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
9 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
10 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
11 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
12 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
16 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
17 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
18 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
19 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
21 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
22 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
23 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
24 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
25 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
26 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
27 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
28 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
32 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
33 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
34 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
35 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
37 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
38 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
39 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 




Table A3 – Continued  
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
46 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
47 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
50 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
51 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
52 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
53 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
54 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
55 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
56 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
57 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
58 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
59 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
60 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
61 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
62 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
63 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
64 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
65 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
66 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
67 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
68 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
69 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
70 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
72 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
74 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
76 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
79 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
85 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
86 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
87 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 




Table A3 – Continued  
Case Conditions Outcome 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  
89 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
91 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
93 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
94 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
96 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
97 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
99 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
101 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 






Table B1 – Truth table for outcome O_time 
Row Conditions Freq. O_ 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  time 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 1 
2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 
3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 
5 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 
6 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 
8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
9 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
11 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
12 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
13 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
14 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
15 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
16 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 0 
19 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 0 
20 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0 
22 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 
23 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 
25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
26 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
31 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 
32 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
33 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
34 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Rows 35 – 256: logical remainders 222 ? 




Table B2 – Truth table for outcome ~O_time 
Row Conditions Freq. O_ 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  time 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
7 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
8 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 21 0 
12 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 12 0 
13 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 0 
14 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 0 
15 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 
16 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 
19 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
20 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
21 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
22 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
23 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
24 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
25 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
26 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
28 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Rows 30 – 256: logical remainders 227 ? 




Table B3 – Truth table for outcome ~O_time 
Row Conditions Freq. O_ 
 capa lega dete cba socn mora gdto proj  time 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 1 
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 1 
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 1 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 1 
6 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 1 
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 
14 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 
15 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
16 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
18 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 
19 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 
20 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 0 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 0 
22 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 
23 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 
24 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 
25 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
26 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
27 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
28 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
29 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
30 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
31 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
32 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
33 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Rows 35 – 256: logical remainders 222 ? 
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